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Abstract 
Deficiency for Price Fixing Right on iron ore are mainly due to some reasons, such as international oligopoly , low 
industrial concentration, imperfections of consortium purchasing and high import dependency. However, the import 
agent system of iron ore also contribute to this problem. Owing to some inner problems, the agent system would 
bring about a dual-pricing system and unfair competition. By analysis the iron ore's import agent system, some 
suggestions that conform to China's actual conditions on iron ore's import agent system have been forword. 
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1. Introduction  
Why it is d ifficult  for China, the world's b iggest exporter on iron ore, to obtain the price power on iron 
ore? Why does the phenomenon of self-defeating emerge? Domestic scholars believe that there are several 
reasons: First,supply market has been monopolized by international monopoly enterprise.  Rio Doceǃ
BHP and Rio Tinto,has dominated more than 90% sea transportation and 80% market. Second ,the 
industrial concentration of domestic steel entreprise is still low. China's industrial concentration on steel 
entreprize is only 43.49%.Third, the consortium purchasing mechanis m of China's steel corporation has 
not been completed yet. Fourth, the rate of import dependency is high in the field of iron ore ,which has 
arrived as high as 69% in 2009. 
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Apart from the above, iron ore's import agent system has also become an indispensable component of 
this problem.  
2. International trade pricing mechanism of iron ore 
2.1 The pros and cons of long-term pricing mechanisms 
The pros of long-term agreement price concentrate on two aspects. First, the fluctuations of iron ore's  
price is comparatively little.Second, Australian  and Brazil ore have relatively  high quality. The cons of 
long-term agreement p rice lie  in  two aspects as well. First, the negotiation of long-term contract is carried 
on in private, so the supplies that possess monopoly positions are on a good wicket. Second , the existence 
of the asymetric information between demander and supplier and the principal-agent problem, For 
example, staffs in Rio Tinto had let out restricted news to outside in July,2009. 
2.2 The pros and cons of spot pricing mechanisms 
The advantages of spot transaction are that as India and China are neighbours, the short -time 
transportation can improve cash flow and return on investment .On the other hand, as a main channel of 
diversify China's import  source of iron ore, th is mode can reduce the rate of dependency on Australian 
and Brazil iron ore as well as add negotiating chips. The disadvantages of spot transaction are the great 
fluctuation on price and relatively poor quality. 
3. China's implementation of iron ore's import agent system 
On February the first 2009, China Iron & Steel Association(CISA) began to formally implement the 
iron ore's import agent system, based on Japan's experience. In Japan,large powerful companies are 
responsible for negotiating long-term agreement price and several independent large agent trafficker in  
charge of import.The agent fee can occupy 1% to 3% of the import price while the agent fee in China is 
3% to 5%. 
3.1 The mechanism of import agent system 
On the implementation of iron ore's import agent system, CISA hopes to improve China's 
disadvantageous position on iron ore's negotiation and the chaotic import order. Its mechanism embodies 
in the following two aspects˖ 
First, it can reduce the the number of import enterprises and form a united front in the steel industry. 
The number of enterprises that have the right to import iron ore has reduced from 500 in 2005 to 118 in  
2006 and  droped another four in 2007 ,among which  , more than 70 is steel company while the rest  is 
trafficker. As too many companies took part in the import , they even bid up against each other to obtain 
iron ore import volume, which certainly embodies the imperfection of consortium purchasing mechanism 
of domestic steel industry and determines that China's fate on iron ore price is still in foreign countries' 
hands. 
Second, it is good for preventing the occurrence of reselling iron ore for high profit.With the rapid 
development of China's steel industry, the rate of dependency on iron ore become higher and higher. At 
presentˈwith the purpose of making high profit by reselling the iron ore to those medium-s mall sized 
steel companies that have no qualification to import iron ore, the above mentioned 112 companies eager 
to increase the import volumes of long-term association mining in succession. In 2008, the price of long-
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term association mining maintains CNY700-800 per ton.However, after reselling to the medium-s mall 
sized steel company ,this price can nearly doubled, reaching as high as CNY1400 per t on . 
3.2 The practical question on import agent system  
With the carry on of the iron ore's import agent system, numerous flaws begin to emerge: 
Primarily, the united front on steel industry has not formed  completely yet. Both the implementation of 
import agent system and the signature of the self-discipline convention only take large-sized steel 
company into consideration but neglect the benefit of medium-small sized company.  
Secondly,the information asymmetry will produce the principal -agent problem.The negotiation on 
long-term agreement  price is carried on in p rivate between two sides.This imperfect negotiating system 
provide ample room for the agency to make profits.  
Thirdly, as long as the existence of reselling iron ore for high profits, it is hard for CISA to supervise. 
Most steel companies and traffickers deny the activity of reselling iron ore. For fear of losing inbound 
channel, the steel company that have no qualification  to import iron ore will not provide iron ore 's import  
price to CISA though they have to purchase iron ore on high price through traffickers.  
Finally, the import agent system leads to the rent-seeking and monopoly. At present , 112 agencies 
provide iron ore to more than 5000 steel companies. The obvious imbalance of supply and de mand make 
the market charactered by oligopoly. It become common occurrence for large steel company to rise price 
on iron ore. On  the other hand, numerous companies' competing with each other for the limit  qualification 
of import iron ore also cause approving authority's rent-seeking to power. 
4. The inner contradictions of iron ore's import agent system 
Iron ore's import agent system aims at two groups. One is large steel company that have the right to 
import iron ore and trafficker, hereinafter big steel company;the other is small steel company that have no 
right to import iron ore. 
4.1 The choice of big steel company and small steel company under the import agent system 
According to the rule of import agent system, all of the import of iron ore is up to co mpanies that are 
entitled to import. As a result, big steel company and part of traffickers consist of the monopoly 
manufacturer of domestic iron ore market. In 2008,  the import vo lume of long-term association min ing 
had not reached 50%, As the sole supply channel ,big steel company have two strategies to import iron ore.  
One is increase the import vo lume of iron ore massively to sufficient  meet domestic demand and then get 
normal agent fee;  the other is increase the import  volume of iron ore appropriately  to make it far less than 
domestic demand and then obtain monopoly return. Apparently, a reasonable manufacturer will choose 
the latter one. Driven by interests, big steel company will jointly formulate import volume and share the 
monopoly return, which will lead to the break of self-discipline convention. 
From the other point, those small company that have no right to import iron ore have to purchase 
surplus iron ore from b ig steel company. Under the situation of serious imbalance between  demander and 
supplier, small steel company are forced to rise purchasing price. Even so, small steel company will not 
expose this illegal action to CISA, for that means the loss of material market. Facing with the insufficient 
supply on iron ore ,small steel company have two strategies as well˖they can  purchase long-term 
association mining on high price in the event that big steel company have broke self -discipline convention; 
Or,they can break the import agent system to purchase spot iron ore from international market on market 
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price. Also, driven by interests, small steel company will opt to purchase iron ore privately, which will 
lead to the break of iron ore's import agent system. 
4.2 The nature of the dilemma 
The reason that import agent system run well in Japan but difficult  in  China is mainly due to the 
difference between two countries' industrial situation.The most obvious difference between China and 
Japan is the industrial concentration. At present, the industrial concentration of China's steel is so low that 
the output of the ten biggest steel companies in China only account for 43.49% of the national overall 
output until the end of 2009, while Nippon Steel and JFE's output each exceed 20% of the total output in 
Japan in 2007. As a result of, the low concentration ration have given rise to the current disorder in the 
domestic steel industry, though China is the biggest steel producing countries in the world. In China ,the 
import volume of long-term association is less than a half of the total import volume while in Japan and 
Europe,this proportion can reach as high as 95%. 
Under the current situation, the enforcement of iron ore's import agent system is sure to cause the short 
supply of domestic iron ore. The short supply is further to cause the rise of price. Driven by interests, self-
discipline convention is undoubted out of action. The big steel company will sell the surplus iron ore to 
the small steel company on a price of higher than the fixed 5% agent fee. Given the co -existence of 
official price and black market price on iron ore and the emergence of a dual-pricing system on iron 
ore ,charactered by planned market, it is no wonder that selling iron ore can make more money than 
selling steel. 
5. Suggestions on localization of China's import agent system 
However, the current situation depart far from the previous purpose of CISA to implement the import 
agent system.Therefore, some urgent measures should be taken to improve the import agent system. 
In allusion to China's current situation on steel industry, with the characteristics of numerous steel 
companies, large scope of sizes and low industrial concentration ,some suggestions are put forward as 
follows: under the current import agent system on iron ore, we should carry on policies on more free 
import volumes of spot iron ore. That is to say, import agent system still be used on long-term association 
mining while the right to import iron ore should be confered to small steel companies under the situation 
of insufficient supply.In this way, the government can carry out macro-control through import tariff. 
As a result , the monopoly profits for b ig steel company on reselling iron ore can be so substantially 
reduced that they will constrain their price among the range of spot price, agent fee or import tariff, 
otherwise ,small steel company will choose to purchase spot iron ore.While for small steel company ,they 
have two choices,either spot price add tariff or price on long-term agreement add agent fee,so they will no 
longer purchase iron ore on monopoly price.By doing so, the public spot price replace the private reselling 
price and the dual-pricing  system gradually  gradually  return to  the course of single-pricing system, so the 
market mechanism can be improved. 
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